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HEALTH CARE LAW
Sean P. Byrne *
Paul Walkinshaw **
Arguably, no other field of law in Virginia matches the com-
plexity, magnitude, and universality of health care. It therefore
comes as little surprise that Virginia's legislative and judicial
branches of government devoted substantial attention to health
care law issues in 2006 and 2007. Between April 2006 and April
2007-the time period covered by this article-the Supreme
Court of Virginia decided a large number of cases directly affect-
ing health care law in the Commonwealth. The 2007 legislative
session also addressed a host of health care issues and those with
the most impact are summarized herein. These judicial and legis-
lative developments have altered Virginia's health care law land-
scape in notable ways, and this article summarizes and analyzes
those changes.
I. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
Although several significant Supreme Court of Virginia opin-
ions were handed down during the last year, reverberations from
one of the court's 2006 cases in particular, Riverside Hospital v.
Johnson,1 are likely to be felt for quite some time. Johnson
touches the heart of hospital-based care and the defense of result-
ing medical negligence litigation. It hints that a hospital's policies
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versity of Richmond; J.D., 1997, University of Richmond School of Law, magna cum laude.
Mr. Byrne's practice concentrates on medical malpractice defense and health care risk
management. He is also an Assistant Adjunct Professor at the University of Richmond
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** Associate, Hancock, Daniel, Johnson & Nagle, Fairfax, Virginia. B.A., 1999, Uni-
versity of Virginia; J.D., 2003, Catholic University School of Law, magna cum laude. Mr.
Walkinshaw's practice concentrates on medical malpractice defense and appellate litiga-
tion.
1. 272 Va. 518, 636 S.E.2d 416 (2006).
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and procedures may be offered to establish the standard of care
while, at the same time, holding that the facts contained in a hos-
pital's incident reports are generally not considered privileged
and can be discovered and admitted into evidence at trial under
certain circumstances.
In addition to Johnson, several of the court's other health care-
related decisions affect a wide range of substantive law. In Castle
v. Lester2 and Kondaurov v. Kerdasha,3 the court addressed the
extent to which a plaintiff can recover for emotional distress.4 In
Holmes v. Levine,' Budd v. Punyanitya,6 and Doherty v. Aleck,7
the court ruled on the admissibility of treating physician and ex-
pert witness testimony.' In Lambert v. Javed, the court held that
a dismissal with prejudice for failure to comply with the statute of
limitations is a dismissal on the merits sufficient to warrant ap-
plication of the res judicata bar.9 But the court held in Hughes v.
Doe that an employee's dismissal with prejudice will not bar an
action against the employer for the dismissed employee's negli-
gence.10
In the area of contribution actions, the court held in Sullivan v.
Robertson that a jury cannot be instructed to apportion damages
among released tortfeasors if the plaintiff suffered an indivisible
injury." Harmon v. Sadjadi" and Janvier v. Arminio" presented
the court with statute of limitations tolling issues. 4 Two other
noteworthy decisions, Ford Motor Co. v. Benitez" and Bio-
Medical Applications v. Coston,16 are sure to alter health care liti-
2. 272 Va. 591, 636 S.E.2d 342 (2006).
3. 271 Va. 646, 629 S.E.2d 181 (2006).
4. Castle, 272 Va. at 600, 636 S.E.2d at 346; Kondaurov, 271 Va. at 656, 629 S.E.2d
at 186.
5. 273 Va. 150, 639 S.E.2d 235 (2007).
6. 273 Va. 583, 643 S.E.2d 180 (2007).
7. 273 Va. 421, 641 S.E.2d 93 (2007).
8. Holmes, 273 Va. at 153, 639 S.E.2d at 236; Budd, 273 Va. at 586-87, 643 S.E.2d at
181; Doherty, 273 Va. at 426, 641 S.E.2d at 94.
9. 273 Va. 307, 309, 641 S.E.2d 109, 110-11 (2007).
10. 273 Va. 45, 48-49, 639 S.E.2d 302, 304 (2007).
11. 273 Va. 84, 91-93, 639 S.E.2d 250, 255-56 (2007).
12. 273 Va. 184, 639 S.E.2d 294 (2007).
13. 272 Va. 353, 634 S.E.2d 754 (2006).
14. Harmon, 273 Va. at 186, 639 S.E. at 295; Janvier, 272 Va. at 357, 634 S.E.2d at
755.
15. 273 Va. 242, 639 S.E.2d 203 (2007).
16. 272 Va. 489, 634 S.E.2d 349 (2006).
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gation pleadings and practice in the future. Finally, in the laconic
Parikh v. Family Care Center case, the court held that a nonpro-
fessional corporation cannot practice medicine in Virginia17-a
decision that may compel some health care providers to revise
their incorporating documents or other operating agreements.
A. Hospital Policies and Procedures and Incident Reports
Riverside Hospital v. Johnson primarily touched on two sub-
stantive areas of health care law:'" (1) the admissibility of a de-
fendant-hospital's policies and procedures19 and (2) the quality
assurance privilege found at Virginia Code section 8.01-581.17 as
it relates to a hospital's incident reports.2 °
The court's rulings on these two important issues emanated
from a relatively straightforward and familiar set of facts. The
administrator of Ms. Johnson's estate brought a personal injury
action against Riverside Hospital alleging that the hospital negli-
gently allowed Ms. Johnson to fall because it failed to identify her
as a high fall-risk patient.2' Because it did not identify Ms. John-
son as a high fall-risk patient, the hospital did not institute a fall-
prevention plan for her.22 The estate argued that an appropriate
fall-prevention plan that included restraints, side bed rails, and a
bed check alarm would have prevented her fall and resulting in-
17. 273 Va. 284, 290, 641 S.E.2d 98, 101 (2007).
18. 272 Va. 518, 526, 636 S.E.2d 416, 420 (2006). The court's opinion also contained
an important ruling on procedural default. The defendants argued to the trial court in a
motion in limine that the court should not allow the plaintiff to introduce evidence of Riv-
erside Hospital's prior patient falls because they were irrelevant to plaintiffs negligence
case. See id. The plaintiff countered that the prior patient falls were relevant to his puni-
tive damages claim. Id. The trial court agreed the prior patient falls were relevant to the
punitive damages claim and denied defendants' motion in limine. Id. The plaintiff later
nonsuited the punitive damages claim, but the defendants did not renew their objection to
the relevance of the prior falls to plaintiffs negligence case. Id. The court held that be-
cause the defendants did not renew their objection to the prior fall evidence once the plain-
tiff nonsuited his punitive damages claim, the objection to its presence in the plaintiffs
negligence case was waived. Id. at 527-28, 636 S.E.2d at 420-21. This ruling provoked a
dissent that focused on the provisions of Virginia Code section § 8.01-384. Id. at 539, 636
S.E.2d at 427-28 (Agee, J., dissenting); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-384 (Repl. Vol. 2000)
("No party, after having made an objection or motion known to the court, shall be required
to make such objection or motion again in order to preserve his right to appeal, challenge,
or move for reconsideration of, a ruling, order, or action of the court.").
19. See Johnson, 272 Va. at 528, 636 S.E.2d at 421.
20. Id. at 530, 636 S.E.2d at 422.
21. Id. at 523, 636 S.E.2d at 418.
22. Id.
2007]
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juries. 23 The hospital countered that the standard of care did not
require the institution of a fall-prevention plan because Ms. John-
son was not a high fall-risk patient.2 4 The central liability issue in
the case, therefore, was whether Ms. Johnson exhibited certain
factors that would have compelled reasonably prudent hospital-
employed nurses to conclude that she was a high fall-risk pa-
tient.25
During its case-in-chief, the estate elicited testimony from two
hospital employees regarding how the hospital instructed new
members of its nursing staff to identify high fall-risk patients.26
The estate also elicited testimony regarding the hospital's affili-
ated School of Nursing curriculum as it pertained to fall-risk as-
sessment.27 The hospital objected to this testimonial evidence on
grounds of relevancy, citing the Supreme Court of Virginia's prior
rulings in Virginia Railway & Power Co. v. Godsey28 and Pullen v.
Nickens 29 that a defendant's "private rules" are not admissible to
prove the standard of care.3 °
In rejecting the hospital's argument, the court noted the hospi-
tal's staff instructions and School of Nursing curriculum were not
the "policies and procedures" 31 of the sort involved in Godsey and
Pullen and, therefore, could not be described as "private rules."32
The court did not elaborate on this distinction further, leaving fu-
ture litigants to scour Godsey and Pullen for guidance on what
constitutes a policy or procedure that can be described as an in-
admissible private rule. Godsey and Pullen will be of little assis-
23. See id. at 524, 636 S.E.2d at 418-19.
24. See id. at 534, 636 S.E.2d at 425.
25. See id. at 523, 636 S.E.2d at 418 (defining the central issues of the case).
26. See id. at 528, 636 S.E.2d at 421.
27. Id.
28. 117 Va. 167, 83 S.E. 1072 (1915).
29. 226 Va. 342, 310 S.E.2d 452 (1983).
30. Johnson, 272 Va. at 529, 636 S.E.2d at 422.
31. The court offered two additional reasons in support of its holding that the trial
court did not err in the admission of the testimonial evidence. First, it noted that the trial
court and the estate "agreed" that the testimonial evidence would not be used to establish
the standard of care. Id. Interestingly, the court reached this conclusion without explain-
ing how the estate's argument that the evidence would be used to "corroborate" its expert's
standard of care opinion differed in any material respect from using the evidence to estab-
lish the standard of care. See id. Second, the court noted that the evidence came in
through the testimony of plaintiffs expert without objection and that "similar" evidence
was offered by the hospital's own expert. See id. at 530, 636 S.E.2d at 422.
32. Id. at 529, 636 S.E.2d at 422.
[Vol. 42:441
HEALTH CARE
tance in this effort because neither opinion contains a detailed
discussion of why the private rules in those cases were labeled
private rules.33
Though its ruling on the admissibility of private rules raises
new questions for debate in future cases about the private rules
doctrine, the court left little doubt that factual statements in in-
cident reports are not privileged, even if later provided to a qual-
ity assurance committee.34 This issue arose because the estate
gained access during discovery to a risk management incident re-
port that factually described the circumstances of Ms. Johnson's
fall.35 The hospital objected to the discovery and admission of the
report on the grounds that it was a written communication pro-
vided to a quality assurance committee, and that Virginia Code
section 8.01-581.17 cloaks such communications with privilege.36
The trial court admitted the report into evidence over the defen-
dant's objection.37
Although the Supreme Court of Virginia agreed that a "literal
application" of the statute's phrase "communications ... provided
33. In Godsey, the plaintiff brought a suit against the railway company alleging it
caused her to fall when it started moving its railcar while the plaintiff was in the process
of boarding. 117 Va. at 171, 83 S.E. at 1073. The plaintiff prevailed in the trial court and
the defendant appealed on the ground that "certain rules of the company" were wrongly
admitted into evidence. Id. at 168, 83 S.E. at 1072. The Godsey court did not describe
these rules further except to note that they were intended for the guidance of the com-
pany's own employees and were not known by the plaintiff. Id. at 168, 83 S.E. at 1072-73.
In Pullen, the plaintiff, Nickens, sued an employee of Virginia's highway repair depart-
ment for failing to post adequate warning signs identifying a section of highway he was
repairing. 226 Va. at 344-45, 310 S.E.2d at 453-54. Pullen had posted signs only at the
beginning and end of the work area, which was approximately eight miles long. See id. at
345, 310 S.E.2d at 453. The failure to post further warning indicia, according to Nickens,
caused another car to swerve around repair equipment in the roadway and crash into
Nickens. See id. At trial, Nickens introduced a document from the state highway depart-
ment entitled "Typical Traffic Control for Work Area Protection" that contained a diagram
with multiple cones placed around the work area. Id. at 345-46, 310 S.E.2d at 454. Al-
though testimonial evidence indicated cones were not required to be placed around a
worksite like that set up by Pullen, the court nevertheless held that these "private rules"
were improperly admitted into evidence. See id. at 350-51, 310 S.E.2d at 456-57.
34. Johnson, 272 Va. at 533-34, 636 S.E.2d at 424-25.
35. Id. at 530, 636 S.E.2d at 422.
36. See id. The relevant portion of Virginia Code section 8.01-581.17(B) provides:
"The proceedings, minutes, records, and reports of any... quality assurance,
quality of care, or peer review committee . . . together with all communica-
tions, both oral and written, . . . provided to such committees or entities, are
privileged communications which may not be disclosed or obtained by legal
discovery proceedings .... "
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17(B) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
37. Johnson, 272 Va. at 530, 636 S.E.2d at 422.
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to such committees" would "impress the privilege" on the incident
report at issue, it declined to interpret the statute in this literal
manner.38 Such an interpretation, the court held, would allow a
hospital to cloak "every statement or document maintained by the
facility" with privilege "simply by insuring that such statement or
document was provided or available to a peer or quality review
committee."39 The court reasoned that the General Assembly did
not intend for the privilege to apply so broadly, referencing the
statute's exception for medical records as evidence of the legisla-
ture's true intent-because medical records contain factual in-
formation and are not privileged, the statute was not designed to
shield factual information from disclosure.4 ° Rather, the statute
was intended to protect only "the deliberative [quality assurance
or peer review] process and conclusions reached through that
process."41 The hospital's incident report did not evidence the de-
liberations or conclusions of the quality assurance process; it con-
tained only factual information.42 Although the court acknowl-
edged that the factual information in an incident report
necessarily initiates the quality assurance process, it concluded
that the confidentiality of factual information is not essential to
that process.43 Applying this reasoning, the court held that the
hospital's incident report was akin to a medical record and there-
fore was not privileged.44
This ruling has caused concern among Virginia health care fa-
cilities engaging in self-critical quality assurance and peer review
analysis. But health care facilities can take some solace that
Johnson focused on the factual information in an incident report,
which is typically discoverable through other sources, rather than
the deliberative analysis conducted by the quality assurance
committees.45 A strong argument survives that a quality assur-
ance committee's deliberative analysis remains protected by the
statute after Johnson. Drawing the line between discoverable fac-
tual investigation and privileged analytical deliberation will
38. Johnson, 272 Va. at 532, 636 S.E.2d at 424.
39. Id. at 532, 636 S.E.2d at 424.
40. See id. at 533, 636 S.E.2d at 424.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 534, 636 S.E.2d at 424-25.
43. See id. at 533, 636 S.E.2d at 424.
44. Id. at 534, 636 S.E.2d at 425.
45. See id. at 533, 636 S.E.2d at 424.
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likely continue to be fodder for discovery combat in Virginia
medical negligence cases.
B. Emotional Distress
The court's decisions in Castle v. Lester46 and Kondaurov v.
Kerdasha47 are instructive regarding allegations of negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress, a claim occasionally included in
medical malpractice suits.
1. Castle v. Lester
In Castle, Karyn Lester and her infant son, Dusty Lester, filed
personal injury actions against Dr. Castle alleging he negligently
monitored and managed the labor and delivery of Dusty.4" Dr.
Castle's negligence caused Dusty to be born with severe physical
injuries and neurological impairment.49 Dr. Castle settled Dusty's
case before trial and stipulated to liability in Ms. Lester's case.5 °
Thus, Ms. Lester's case proceeded to trial against Dr. Castle on
the issue of damages only, with a focus on the extent of her emo-
tional distress as the mother of the injured child.5 1
At trial, Ms. Lester introduced evidence of her son's severe
physical and neurological injuries, his daily care needs, and his
shortened life expectancy to support her emotional distress
claim.52 Dr. Castle argued evidence of the child's injuries should
not have been admitted in the mother's case because it essentially
allowed the child to recover twice for his injuries; Dusty had al-
ready recovered once for these injuries in the settlement of his
separate claim.53
Dr. Castle's double-recovery argument took issue with a long-
standing paradox in this complex area of law. In short, the para-
46. 272 Va. 591, 636 S.E.2d 342 (2006).
47. 271 Va. 646, 629 S.E.2d 181 (2006).
48. Castle, 272 Va. at 595-96, 636 S.E.2d at 343.
49. Dusty's impairment was profound. Ms. Lester's expert testified that Dusty would
likely never attain the functional level of a three-month-old child. Id. at 597-98, 636
S.E.2d at 344-45.
50. Id. at 596, 636 S.E.2d at 344.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. Id.
20071
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dox is that damage suffered by a fetus in utero constitutes legal
injury only to the mother-not the fetus-because a fetus in utero
is not a person but rather part of the mother, except that if the fe-
tus is born alive, the in utero damage constitutes legal injury to
both the mother and the fetus, the latter-having been born
alive-now a person that can recover for injuries sustained even
when he was not a person but rather an appendage of his
mother. 4 The problem for Dr. Castle was that the Supreme Court
of Virginia had taken cognizance of this paradox in Bulala v.
Boyd55 and did not find it to be nearly as unsettling as he did.56
Thus, Dr. Castle's appeal was essentially a plea to overturn Bu-
lala.57 Utilizing the familiar cliche that stare decisis is "more
than a mere clich6" in Virginia, the court declined Dr. Castle's in-
vitation to overturn Bulala.18
Barring an outright reversal of Bulala, Dr. Castle argued that,
at the very least, Bulala should be limited to its specific language
-a mother can recover for mental anguish associated with the
birth of a defective child.59 In other words, while Ms. Lester can
recover for mental anguish resulting from the actual birth proc-
ess, she should not be allowed to recover for mental anguish re-
sulting from living with and caring for a child with severe physi-
cal and neurological injuries.60 The court rejected this argument,
noting first that Dusty's physical and neurological injuries were
clearly relevant to Ms. Lester's emotional distress claim.61 It
noted second that any other holding would be contrary to estab-
lished fundamental proximate causation principles, which estab-
54. See Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 140-42, 169 S.E.2d 440, 441-42
(1969) (holding that a fetus has no right to recover for personal injuries because it is not a
"person"); see also Kalafut v. Gruver, 239 Va. 278, 283-84, 389 S.E.2d 681, 683-84 (1990)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869(1) (1979)) (holding that a fetus born alive
can recover for injuries it sustained while in the womb); Modaber v. Kelley, 232 Va. 60, 66,
348 S.E.2d 233, 237 (1986) (holding that a mother can recover for personal injuries when
her fetus is injured in utero and stillborn because the fetus is part of the mother). See gen-
erally Fairfax Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. McCarty, 244 Va. 28, 37, 419 S.E.2d 621, 626-27 (1992)
(upholding a jury verdict for a mother who claimed emotional distress resulting solely
from injury to her fetus, not from any independent physical injury).
55. 239 Va. 218, 229, 389 S.E.2d 670, 675 (1990).
56. See Castle, 272 Va. at 603-04, 636 S.E.2d at 348.
57. See id. at 600, 636 S.E.2d at 346.
58. Id. at 601-02, 636 S.E.2d at 347.
59. Id. at 608, 636 S.E.2d at 350-51.
60. See id.
61. See id., 636 S.E.2d at 351.
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lish that a tortfeasor is liable for the reasonably foreseeable con-
sequences of his negligence.62
Castle's ruling on the admissibility of the child's injuries to
support the mother's emotional distress claims arguably makes
birth injury cases-which already present high exposure for
health care defendants because there are two patients, mother
and baby, and thus potential liability of up to two medical mal-
practice caps-particularly dangerous when such actions are
tried as two separate cases where each jury has an opportunity to
hear and compensate for the mother's difficulties in caring for an
injured child. The possibility of double recovery for such injuries,
and the Bulala paradox, remain.
2. Kondaurov v. Kerdasha
While Castle seems to clarify and reaffirm existing law on the
issue of emotional distress, Kondaurov v. Kerdasha may extend
it. Although not a medical malpractice case, Kondaurov is in-
structive on how such claims may be addressed in the health care
law context going forward. In Kondaurov, the plaintiff Kerdasha
was traveling in a Jeep with her dog when a bus struck it from
behind.63 The collision with the bus set off a chain of events lead-
ing to the Jeep being struck by an ambulance, which flipped the
Jeep onto its top.64 Kerdasha sustained relatively minor physical
injuries, such as bruises and cervical stiffness.65 The same could
not be said for her dog, who was thrown from the Jeep, sustained
injuries to its tail, and had to have its tail partially amputated.66
In the ensuing lawsuit, the plaintiff did not allege that her
relatively slight physical injuries caused her emotional distress
but rather argued that her emotional distress emanated from
concern about her dog.67 Although the main issue in the case was
whether the plaintiff could recover for emotional distress emanat-
ing from her worry about the dog,6" the court's analysis of this is-
62. Id. at 608-09, 636 S.E.2d at 351.
63. 271 Va. 646, 650, 629 S.E.2d 181, 183 (2006).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 651, 629 S.E.2d at 183.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 656, 629 S.E.2d at 186.
68. See id. at 654, 629 S.E.2d at 185. Relying on the well-settled, though not alto-
gether uncontroversial, rule that a dog is no more than personal property, see VA. CODE
20071
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sue arguably changed the factors necessary for recovery of emo-
tional distress and the traditional understanding of the "eggshell
psyche" rule.69
On the issue of the factors necessary for recovery for emotional
distress, the court held that the plaintiff could "clearly" recover
for emotional distress resulting from the physical impact of the
crash.7" In its discussion of the physical impact that entitled the
plaintiff to recover for emotional distress, the court avoided any
mention of plaintiffs actual physical injuries-bruises and cervi-
cal stiffness.71 This analysis of physical impact-which appears
just a few sentences after the court noted the plaintiff made no
claim that her physical injuries caused her emotional distress-
certainly gives the appearance that the plaintiff could recover for
emotional distress resulting from something less than physical
injury, that something less being physical impact.72 But it is the
connection between physical injury and emotional distress, ac-
cording to established precedent, that normally makes a claim for
emotional distress possible.73 Consideration of this traditional
connection, together with the structure of the court's analysis,
suggests that the court held that emotional distress need not be
connected to a physical injury if a connection to physical impact is
ANN. § 3.1-796.127 (Repl. Vol. 1994), and that emotional distress cannot emanate from
damage to an item of personal property, no matter how dear the owner holds the property,
see, e.g., Kondaurov, 271 Va. at 657 n.4, 629 S.E.2d at 187 n.4 (citing no less than sixteen
out-of-state cases that denied recovery for emotional distress emanating from injury or
death to animals); White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Swiney, 237 Va. 23, 30, 376 S.E.2d 283,
287 (1989) (stating that damages for injury to personal property is equivalent to the fair
market value of the property before the injury less the fair market value of the injury), the
court agreed the defendant was not entitled to an instruction to that effect. Kondaurov,
271 Va. at 657-58, 629 S.E.2d at 187.
69. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
70. Kondaurov, 271 Va. at 656, 629 S.E.2d at 186.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See, e.g., Bruce v. Madden, 208 Va. 636, 640, 160 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1968) ("[Ilt is
well settled in this jurisdiction that mental anguish may be inferred in those instances
where such would be the natural and probable consequence of bodily injury and that it is
error in such a situation to refuse to instruct the jury that it may consider mental anguish
as an element of damages."); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Marpole, 97 Va. 594, 599-600, 34
S.E. 462, 464 (1899) ("Where there is bodily injury... mental suffering necessarily enters
into the consideration of the damages which should be allowed by the jury, if they find
that the plaintiff is entitled to damages for the bodily injuries he has sustained by reason
of the negligence of the defendant."). But see Naacesh v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 416, 290
S.E.2d 825, 830 (1982) (allowing plaintiffs, a mother and father, to recover for emotional
distress associated with "wrongful birth of a child in the absence of direct or indirect
physical injury").
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established.74 But it is doubtful the court intended this result for
at least two reasons.
First, the court perhaps unwittingly75 gave the appearance that
a dichotomy exists between physical impact and physical injury.
In fact, prior cases have used the terms synonymously. Decades
ago in Hughes the court rejected the so-called "physical impact"
rule,76 which allowed the plaintiffs to recover for emotional dis-
tress manifesting itself physically, but only if the negligence that
caused the emotional distress also caused contemporaneous
physical injury.77 It was the contemporaneous-physical-injury re-
quirement that the court sometimes referred to as a physical-
impact requirement and that became the namesake of the re-
jected line of cases requiring it. 78 Hughes clarified that a plaintiff
need not suffer contemporaneous physical injury (read "physical
impact") to recover for emotional distress so long as the emotional
distress physically manifested itself and there was an "unbroken
chain of causal connection between the negligent act, the emo-
tional disturbance, and the physical injury."79
Second, Kondaurov fits neatly into the rationale of Hughes, al-
though reference to only the analysis portion of the opinion is
unlikely to reveal this conclusion. From the factual portion of the
opinion, it is evident the plaintiffs emotional distress manifested
itself physically by worsening the symptoms of the plaintiffs mul-
tiple sclerosis.8 0 But the connection between this physical mani-
festation and the plaintiffs emotional distress was omitted from
the court's pronouncement that the plaintiff could "clearly" re-
74. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (describing how the plaintiff could
recover for a physical impact).
75. But then again, perhaps not.
76. See generally Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973). In Hughes, the
defendant crashed his car into the plaintiffs front porch while she was standing in her liv-
ing room. Id. at 28, 197 S.E.2d at 215. Although the plaintiff sustained no physical injury
as a result of the crash, she developed severe anxiety after the crash. Id. This anxiety
caused the plaintiff, who had recently given birth, to stop lactating and caused her men-
strual period to start. Id.
77. See id. at 29, 197 S.E.2d at 216 (noting that the defendant argued that the plain-
tiff cannot recover for emotional distress in a negligence case where there was no contem-
poraneous physical injury to the plaintiff, i.e. where physical impact was lacking).
78. See id. at 33-34, 197 S.E.2d at 218-19 (noting that "[a] rapidly increasing majority
of courts have repudiated or not followed the 'impact rule'" and citing numerous out-of-
state cases).
79. Id. at 34, 197 S.E.2d at 219.
80. Kondaurov v. Kerdasha, 271 Va. 646, 651, 629 S.E.2d 181, 183 (2006). The emo-
tional distress also caused tremors and motor tics. Id. at 652-53, 629 S.E.2d at 184.
2007]
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cover for emotional distress resulting from the physical impact of
the accident.8' Had the court expressly made this connection, it
would have demonstrated the causality Hughes required-from
the negligent act to the emotional disturbance to a resultant
physical manifestation-in cases where the emotional distur-
bance is not caused by physical injury contemporaneous with the
act of negligence. Of course, it would also have made it a much
less interesting opinion.
Kondaurov nevertheless remains notable for the impact it may
have on the "eggshell psyche" rule in Virginia. To set the stage,
Hughes made clear that although it would not follow the physical
impact rule, recovery for emotional distress would still be "subject
to familiar limitations."82 One of these familiar limitations is a
tortfeasor cannot be held liable for the mental and emotional dis-
turbances of a hypersensitive person unless he has specific
knowledge of the hypersensitivity before the commission of the
tort.83 In other words, tortfeasors do not take their plaintiffs' psy-
ches as they find them even if they must so take their thin
skulls. 4 Kondaurov, however, noted that the jury could properly
consider as part of its evaluation of plaintiffs emotional distress
claim whether the impact of the accident exacerbated the plain-
tiffs "pre-existing mental and physical conditions."85 Although
considering exacerbation of the plaintiffs preexisting physical
condition is unobjectionable thanks to the "eggshell skull" rule,
the "eggshell psyche" rule announced in Hughes militates against
considering the preexisting mental state of Kerdasha, who was
noted to be emotionally unstable before the accident.86 Though
this potential sub silentio change in the law was the subject of a
81. See id. at 656, 629 S.E.2d at 186; see supra note 71-73 and accompanying text.
82. Hughes, 214 Va. at 34, 197 S.E.2d at 219.
83. Id. ("Absent specific knowledge by a defendant of a plaintiffs unusual sensitivity,
there should be no recovery for mental or emotional disturbance and consequent physical
injury to a hypersensitive person where a normal individual would not be affected under
the circumstances.").
84. The eggshell skull rule is shorthand for the rule that a "[a] defendant... must
take the plaintiff as he finds him" when it comes to the plaintiffs preexisting physical
condition. Bradner v. Mitchell, 234 Va. 483, 489, 362 S.E.2d 718, 722 (1987) (citing
Ragsdale v. Jones, 202 Va. 278, 282-83, 117 S.E.2d 114, 118 (1960)) ("Although not re-
sponsible for the pre-existing condition itself, [the defendant] is liable for any exacerbation
of it caused by his tortious conduct.").
85. Kondaurov, 271 Va. at 656, 629 S.E.2d at 186.
86. See id. at 651, 629 S.E.2d at 183 (noting that eighteen months before the accident
the plaintiff acquired her dog "primarily to help her maintain emotional stability and pre-
vent or moderate her 'stress attacks").
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motion for reconsideration that prompted an apparently fazed
court to vacate its initial unanimous opinion, 7 the court became
unfazed and left untouched in its second unanimous opinion the
language allowing the jury to consider the exacerbation of plain-
tiffs preexisting mental condition."8
C. Treating Physician and Expert Testimony
Although Kondaurov will indirectly impact medical malpractice
actions when, as is often the case, a plaintiff claims emotional dis-
tress, Holmes, Budd, and Doherty directly impact an issue that
arises in nearly every medical malpractice case-the testimony of
treating physicians and experts.
1. Holmes v. Levine
In Holmes, a wrongful death case, the plaintiffs estate ap-
pealed a defense verdict on several grounds, arguing primarily
that the jury was wrongly instructed on the issue of proximate
causation. 9 The estate's theory of liability in the case was that
the defendant-radiologist failed to timely diagnose bladder can-
cer, and this failure, along with the bladder cancer itself, caused
the decedent's untimely death.9 ° The estate asked for an addi-
tional sentence to the model jury instruction on proximate
cause, 91 proposing that the court add a statement that there can
be more than one proximate cause of an event.92 The trial judge
denied the request, but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed.
The court held that the evidence fairly supported the estate's the-
ory of the case that there were multiple causes of the plaintiffs
death, and, therefore, it was entitled to the proposed additional
87. See Kondaurov v. Kerdasha, 270 Va. 356, 619 S.E.2d 457 (2005), vacated and reh'g
granted by order dated November 10, 2005. For an excellent first-hand account of the pro-
cedural history of the case, along with additional discussion of Kondaurov's impact, see
Thomas C. Junker, Did the Supreme Court of Virginia Really Hold that the "Eggshell
Skull Rule" Extends to an "Eggshell Psyche," in Its Recent Decision in Kondaurov v. Ker-
dasha, VSB Litig. News, Fall 2006, at 1, 4-7, available at http://www.vsb.org/sections/lg/
archives/Fall%202006.pdf.
88. See Kondaurov, 271 Va. at 656, 629 S.E.2d at 186; see also Junker, supra note 87,
at 6.
89. Holmes v. Levine, 273 Va. 150, 153, 639 S.E.2d 235, 236 (2007).
90. Id. at 159, 639 S.E.2d at 239.
91. VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 5-2.
92. Holmes, 273 Va. at 157, 639 S.E.2d at 238.
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language in the causation jury instruction, which correctly stated
the law.93 The court reversed the jury verdict on this ground and
tackled two issues that were likely to arise on retrial.
The first issue involved a treating physician's testimony that
"she 'did not think that an occasional red blood cell would qualify
for microscopic hematuria.' 94 The estate objected to the physi-
cian's opinion on the grounds that Virginia Code section 8.01-
399(B) 95 prohibited its admission because it was a diagnosis that
was not contemporaneously documented in the physician's chart
and was not offered to a reasonable degree of medical probabil-
ity.96 The court rejected the estate's argument, concluding first
that the physician's opinion was not a diagnosis per se, but was
rather a mental impression the physician formed during her
treatment of the decedent. 97 Because the opinion was not a diag-
nosis, the statute's mandate that "[o]nly diagnos[es] offered to a
reasonable degree of medical probability shall be admissible at
trial" did not apply. 98 The court also concluded that the statute's
93. Id. at 160, 639 S.E.2d at 240. The defendant did not argue that there was only one
proximate cause of the decedent's death, choosing instead to argue that the jury instruc-
tion's use of the indefinite article "a" before the term "proximate cause" implied that there
can be more than one proximate cause of death. Thus, an additional sentence was unwar-
ranted. See id. at 159-60, 639 S.E.2d at 239-40. But the court found this unavailing,
pointing to the trial transcript in which the trial judge used the definite article "the" when
charging the jury. Id. at 160, 639 S.E.2d at 240.
94. Id. at 160, 639 S.E.2d at 240.
95. The relevant portion of Virginia Code section 8.01-399(B) provides:
If the physical or mental condition of the patient is at issue in a civil action,
the diagnoses, signs and symptoms, observations, evaluations, histories, or
treatment plan of the practitioner, obtained or formulated as contemporane-
ously documented during the course of the practitioner's treatment, together
with the facts communicated to, or otherwise learned by, such practitioner in
connection with such attendance, examination or treatment shall be disclosed
but only in discovery pursuant to the Rules of Court or through testimony at
the trial of the action .... Only diagnosis offered to a reasonable degree of
medical probability shall be admissible at trial.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-399(B) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
96. Holmes, 273 Va. at 161, 639 S.E.2d at 240.
97. See id. at 162, 639 S.E.2d at 241. Indeed, under Pettus v. Gottfried, 269 Va. 69,
606 S.E.2d 819 (2005), this opinion would not only be non-diagnostic, it would be labeled
as factual in nature. See id. at 77-78, 606 S.E.2d at 824-25 (holding that the physician's
opinion in that case "was factual in nature because it served to explain the impressions
and conclusions [the physician] reached while treating" the plaintiff and thus "was not
subject to the general rule that a medical expert opinion must be rendered to a reasonable
degree of medical probability"). But cf. King v. Cooley, No. 062502, 2007 Va. LEXIS 101,
*6-8 (Sept. 14, 2007) (declining to decide whether a treating physician's diagnosis, which
was reached during his care and treatment of the patient, was an expert opinion that had
to be disclosed pursuant to the court's pretrial scheduling order).
98. Holmes, 273 Va. at 162, 639 S.E.2d at 241.
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contemporaneous-documentation requirement was satisfied be-
cause the physician's medical record regarding this patient con-
tained a reference to a trace amount of blood in the decedent's
urine, although it had not used the word "hematuria."99 Whatever
distinction existed between the chart and the language used to
articulate the physician's opinion at trial constituted proper
grounds for cross-examination but not for exclusion of the testi-
mony. 100
The second issue the court addressed was whether the trial
court erred in instructing the jury to disregard testimony elicited
from the defendant's expert on cross-examination regarding the
cause of death listed in decedent's death certificate, which was
"[biladder cancer, metastatic."1°1 The estate argued that Virginia
Code section 8.01-401.11°2 allowed it to elicit this evidence on
cross-examination because it contradicted the expert's causation
opinion. The court determined Virginia Code section 8.01-401.1
actually prohibited the testimony because the expert never testi-
fied he relied on the cause of death listed in the death certifi-
cate-which is normally inadmissible evidence 10 3-when forming
his opinions. 104 In not so many words, the court held the statute
permits an expert to testify about inadmissible evidence if, but
only if, the expert relied on such inadmissible evidence in forming
99. See id. at 163 n.8, 639 S.E.2d at 241 n.8.
100. See id. at 163, 639 S.E.2d at 241-42.
101. Id. at 156, 163, 639 S.E.2d at 237, 242.
102. The relevant portion of Virginia Code section 8.01-401.1 provides:
In any civil action any expert witness may give testimony and render an
opinion or draw inferences from facts, circumstances or data made known to
or perceived by such witness at or before the hearing or trial during which he
is called upon to testify. The facts, circumstances or data relied upon by such
witness in forming an opinion or drawing inferences, if of a type normally re-
lied upon by others in the particular field of expertise in forming opinions and
drawing inferences, need not be admissible in evidence.
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons
therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the
court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose
the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.1 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
103. Holmes, 273 Va. at 163 n.10, 164, 639 S.E.2d at 242 n.10 (quoting Edwards v.
Jackson, 210 Va. 450, 453, 171 S.E.2d 854, 856 (1970)) (noting that the cause of death
listed in the death certificate is not competent evidence).
104. See id. at 164, 639 S.E.2d at 242 ("The record is devoid of any evidence that [the
expert] relied on the death certificate and its statement as to the cause of Holmes' death in
forming his opinions about which he testified.").
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his opinions."0 5 Under this analysis, the hook, as it relates to in-
admissible evidence, is reliance. 106
The estate apparently raised the concern that this view of Vir-
ginia Code section 8.01-401.1 essentially allows an expert to insu-
late himself from cross-examination if he testifies that he did not
rely upon the information counsel seeks with which to cross-
examine him. In its original opinion issued on January 12, 2007,
the court discarded the estate's concern in a footnote without dis-
cussion. 117 But in a revised opinion issued March 27, 2007, the
court added a sentence to the text of its opinion in an apparent
attempt to assuage the same concern: "Our conclusion, however,
does not mean that the Administrator was precluded from cross-
examining [the expert] about whether he relied on the death cer-
tificate in formulating his opinions and, if not, why he discounted
the information contained in the death certificate." 8 This con-
cluding sentence, while providing comfort in that it limits the
scope of the ruling and preserves an important aspect of cross-
examination, creates the challenge for attorneys of walking the
tight rope between cross-examining an expert about why he dis-
counted certain inadmissible information and cross-examining an
expert with the content of the actual inadmissible information.
The Holmes opinion seems to permit the former, but prohibit the
latter.
2. Budd v. Punyanitya
Budd involved a similar but more discrete subset of cross-
examination allowed by Virginia Code section 8.01-401.1-the
cross-examination of experts with medical literature deemed to be
reliable authority. The relevant portion of the statute provides:
To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-
examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examina-
tion, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals or
105. See id.
106. See id. A fair reading of the statute would suggest it does not prohibit cross-
examination of an expert witness with admissible information, irrespective of whether
that expert relied on such information.
107. Id. at 165 n.ll, 639 S.E.2d at 242 n.ll ("We reject the Administrator's argument
that the trial court's striking that portion of [the expert's] testimony deprived him of the
opportunity to test [the expert's] credibility and to cross-examine him for bias.").
108. Id. at 165, 639 S.E.2d at 242-43.
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pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine or other science or art,
established as a reliable authority by testimony or by stipulation
shall not be excluded as hearsay. If admitted, the statements may be
read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits. If the state-
ments are to be introduced through an expert witness upon direct
examination, copies of the statements shall be provided to opposing
parties thirty days prior to trial unless otherwise ordered by the
court. 109
The plaintiff in Budd read the statute to require only that he
identify thirty days prior to trial certain medical articles and
statements therein that his expert would read into evidence on
direct examination.11 ° Budd did not comply with this notice re-
quirement because he did not want his expert to read the articles
or statements into evidence on direct examination.' 1 ' Rather, he
wanted his expert to opine on direct simply that the articles were
"reliable authority.""' 2 Once established as reliable authority by
his expert, Budd intended to use the articles and statements
therein to cross-examine the defendant's experts.1"' Budd at-
tempted to utilize this tactic because he feared the defendant's
experts would not acknowledge the articles as reliable authority,
thus preventing him from cross-examining them with the arti-
cles. 1 4 In an opinion notable for at least three pronouncements,
the Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed with Budd's argument
that the statute's notice requirement did not apply to him.
First, the court held that the purpose of the statute is to afford
"meaningful cross-examination" of experts." 5 Budd's interpreta-
tion would frustrate that purpose because it would deny the op-
posing expert an "opportunity to review and formulate a response
to the published statements."" 6 Such an interpretation would ad-
ditionally conflict "with traditional notions of fair play in the ad-
versarial process."" 7 Thus, Budd should have notified defense
109. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.1 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
110. Budd v. Punyanitya, 273 Va. 583, 588, 643 S.E.2d 180, 182 (2007).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 594, 643 S.E.2d at 186.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 595, 643 S.E.2d at 186.
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counsel thirty days before trial of the articles and the statements
he intended to use for cross-examination purposes. 118
Second, the court reaffirmed Hopkins v. Gromovsky,"9 an ear-
lier case that stood for the proposition that a party could, without
violating the hearsay rule, cross-examine an opposing party's ex-
pert with statements from reliable authority if "the statements
... are used solely for the purpose of testing an expert's knowl-
edge, reading and accuracy in a field of expertise, and are not
read directly or indirectly to the jury as substantive evidence re-
garding the contents of the literature or the opinions of its au-
thor."12 In this situation, neither the hearsay rule nor the notice
requirements of Virginia Code section 8.01-401.1 are impli-
cated. 121
Third, the court gave tacit approval to Budd's strategy of utiliz-
ing his own experts to establish medical articles as reliable au-
thority.122 This tactic is specifically authorized in the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 123 but had not been explicitly recognized by an
appellate court in Virginia. 124
3. Doherty v. Aleck
In Doherty, the court reiterated and applied its holding in Bitar
v. Rahman125 that a litigant must promptly object to an expert's
118. Id. at 595, 643 S.E.2d at 186-87.
119. 198 Va. 389, 94 S.E.2d 190 (1956).
120. Budd, 273 Va. at 594, 643 S.E.2d at 186.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 595, 643 S.E.2d at 186-87. ("[W]e hold that when a party intends to in-
troduce into evidence statements from published literature during the cross-examination
of an opposing expert, but wishes to avoid the possibility that the opposing expert will not
acknowledge that literature as a reliable authority on a particular matter at issue by hav-
ing the party's own expert establish the literature as a reliable authority on direct examina-
tion, the party must provide opposing counsel with copies of the statements in the litera-
ture thirty days before trial pursuant to Code § 8.01-401.1." (emphasis added)).
123. See FED. R. EVID. 803(18) advisory committee's note ("The rule does not require
that the witness rely upon or recognize the treatise as authoritative, thus avoiding the
possibility that the expert may at the outset block cross-examination by refusing to con-
cede reliance or authoritativeness.").
124. Although the facts of the case concerned plaintiff using his own experts, it stands
to reason that the same tactic would be available to defendants. Barring some unusual
circumstance, however, defendants' experts usually testify after plaintiffs' experts. Thus,
to utilize the tactic employed in Budd, a defendant would have to convince a trial court to
accept a proffer that his expert will testify that certain articles are reliable authority be-
fore crossing a recalcitrant plaintiffs expert with such articles.
125. 272 Va. 130, 630 S.E.2d 319 (2006).
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testimony if it is not offered to a reasonable degree of medical
probability.12 Such an objection goes to the admissibility of the
testimony, not to its sufficiency, and thus the objection comes too
late if made for the first time in a motion to strike for insufficient
evidence. 127 The court, therefore, rejected the defendant's argu-
ment in Doherty that the trial court's order sustaining a motion to
strike could be upheld on the ground that the plaintiff's expert
did not testify to a reasonable degree of medical probability. 128
The defendant had not objected to this flaw in the expert's testi-
mony at the time, instead arguing in a motion to strike that the
testimony lacked the necessary foundation.'29 Because no timely
objection was made to the testimony, "the trial court should not
have considered [the defendant's] argument in deciding whether
there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury verdict."' 30
D. Vicarious Liability and Res Judicata
In two cases this past year, the court addressed the application
of the res judicata bar. While not unique to health care law, the
ramifications of these decisions will be seen in medical malprac-
tice cases that commonly involve multiple parties and respondeat
superior issues. The first case, Lambert, holds that a dismissal
with prejudice for failure to comply with the statute of limitations
triggers application of the res judicata bar. In the second case,
Hughes, the court held that dismissal with prejudice in favor of
an employee on statute of limitations grounds was not sufficient
for application of the res judicata bar in favor of the employer.
1. Lambert v. Javed
Lambert involved a procedural morass that arose from three
nearly identical wrongful death actions filed against numerous
health care providers. The first action was timely filed.' 3 ' A few
months later, the plaintiff filed a second action.'32 The second ac-
126. See Doherty v. Aleck, 273 Va. 421, 426, 641 S.E.2d 93, 95-96 (2007).
127. Id., 641 S.E.2d at 95 (citing Bitar, 272 Va. at 139, 630 S.E.2d at 324).
128. Id., 641 S.E.2d at 95-96.
129. See id., 641 S.E.2d at 95.
130. Id., 641 S.E.2d at 96.
131. Lambert v. Javed, 273 Va. 307, 309, 641 S.E.2d 109, 110 (2007).
132. Id.
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tion was filed beyond the limitations period. 3 After filing the
second action, the plaintiff nonsuited the first action and then
promptly filed a third action. 13 4 The third action would have been
beyond the limitations period but for the provisions of Virginia
Code section 8.01-229(E), which gave the plaintiff six months af-
ter the nonsuit of the first action to file the third action. 135 But
while the third action was pending, the defendants secured a
dismissal "with prejudice" of the second action because it was
filed after the expiration of the statute of limitations.'36 The de-
fendants then successfully applied the dismissal with prejudice of
the second action to the third action, securing the latter's dis-
missal by application of res judicata. 137
Upholding the dismissal, the court noted that a dismissal that
includes the words "'with prejudice,' extinguishes the viability of
plaintiffs claim against the dismissed party." 3 ' This is so even
though the dismissal "may not be based on an adjudication of the
merits of the cause of action" but rather on procedural grounds,
like the statute of limitations.'39 Although this holding would
have been enough to defeat the plaintiffs third action, the court
also noted that the limitations period in a wrongful death action
is a substantive element of the claim and that a dismissal for
failure to comply with the limitations period is a dismissal on the
merits of the claim. 4 ° This additional wrinkle "directly" sup-
133. See id. at 309-10, 641 S.E.2d at 110.
134. Id. at 309, 641 S.E.2d at 110.
135. In relevant part, the section provides:
If a plaintiff suffers a voluntary nonsuit as prescribed in § 8.01-380, the stat-
ute of limitations with respect to such action shall be tolled by the com-
mencement of the nonsuited action, and the plaintiff may recommence his ac-
tion within six months from the date of the order entered by the court, or
within the original period of limitation .... whichever period is longer.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(E)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
136. Lambert, 273 Va. at 309-10, 641 S.E.2d at 110.
137. Id. at 310, 641 S.E.2d at 110.
138. Id. at 310, 641 S.E.2d at 111.
139. Id. When read in conjunction with its decision in Hughes, see infra Part I(D)(2),
and Shutler, see infra note 151, the court appears to have created a hybrid res judicata
doctrine. While acknowledging that dismissals with prejudice on procedural grounds, like
failure to comply with the statute of limitations, are not technically decisions on the mer-
its, the court has held that such dismissals nonetheless "extinguish" the plaintiffs right to
institute an action against the dismissed party. See, e.g., Hughes v. Doe, 273 Va. 45, 48-
49, 639 S.E.2d 302, 304 n. 2 (2007); Lambert, 273 Va. at 310, 641 S.E.2d at 111; Shutler v.
Augusta Health Care for Women, P.L.C., 272 Va. 87, 93, 630 S.E.2d 313, 316 (2006).
140. Lambert, 273 Va. at 310, 641 S.E.2d at 111 (citing Riddett v. Va. Elec. & Power
Co., 255 Va. 23, 28, 495 S.E.2d 819, 821-22 (1998)).
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ported the application of res judicata to bar the plaintiffs third
action. 141
2. Hughes v. Doe
The court again considered the doctrine of res judicata in
Hughes, but this time in the specific context of the employer-
employee relationship. The plaintiff in Hughes filed a timely law-
suit against Pratt Medical Center alleging that one of its employ-
ees, who was unknown to the plaintiff at the time of filing, negli-
gently performed a venipuncture procedure. 142 The plaintiff
subsequently learned the employee's name-Melissa Lucas-and
amended his lawsuit to include her."' By the time the plaintiff
filed suit against Lucas, however, the statute of limitations had
expired and Pratt obtained a dismissal with prejudice for Lucas
on that ground.' Pratt then used that judgment in its own case
to secure a dismissal.145 On appeal, Pratt argued the claim
against it was wholly derivative of the claim against its employee
and the dismissal with prejudice of the claim against the em-
ployee constituted a decision on the merits sufficient to trigger
the res judicata bar. 146
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Pratt's argument that
the derivative liability principle mandated application of the res
judicata bar. 47 Rather, the court noted it has never applied the
derivative liability principle in a case like this where the em-
ployee was dismissed on procedural grounds. 4 ' The principle has
been applied in favor of an employer only when, in the same case,
the employee is factually exonerated149 or when, in a subsequent
case, a decision on the merits was reached in prior litigation suffi-
cient to justify application of the res judicata bar. 50 Neither cir-
141. Id.
142. Hughes, 273 Va. at 47, 639 S.E.2d at 303.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 47-48, 639 S.E.2d at 303.
147. Id. at 48, 639 S.E.2d at 303-04.
148. Id., 639 S.E.2d at 304.
149. Id., 639 S.E.2d at 303-04 (citing Roughton Pontiac Corp. v. Alston, 236 Va. 152,
156-57, 372 S.E.2d 147, 150 (1988); Rakes v. Fulcher, 210 Va. 542, 549, 172 S.E.2d 751,
757 (1970); Whitfield v. Whittaker Mem'l Hosp., 210 Va. 176, 183, 169 S.E.2d 563, 568
(1969); Va. State Fair Ass'n v. Burton, 182 Va. 365, 368, 28 S.E.2d 716, 717 (1944)).
150. Id. (citing Ward v. Charlton, 177 Va. 101, 115, 12 S.E.2d 791, 796 (1941)).
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cumstance was present here because the dismissal of Lucas on
statute of limitations grounds did not amount to an "affirmative
finding of non-negligence."' 51 Thus, the court held the dismissal
with prejudice did not exonerate Pratt and the lawsuit against it
could proceed. 15
2
E. Contribution: Sullivan v. Robertson Drug Co.
Sullivan arose from a previous action filed by the plaintiff,
Hopper, against Dr. Sullivan. " Hopper alleged that Dr. Sullivan
negligently prescribed him unlimited refills of corticosteroids and
that this over-prescription led Hopper to develop Cushing's syn-
drome.' 54 Dr. Sullivan settled Hopper's claim but then pursued a
contribution action against the pharmacist, Robertson, and his
company, Robertson Drug, who filled the prescriptions. 5 At the
trial on the contribution action, the evidence established that
each injection of the corticosteroid had a "cumulative effect" on
Hopper's development of Cushing's syndrome. 1
56
On appeal, the court addressed two issues. The first issue was
whether the jury was properly instructed to apportion damages
based on its assessment of the relative degrees of fault of all the
tortfeasors. 157 The court concluded this instruction was improper
because Hopper's injury was indivisible, and established caselaw
holds that, when a person's indivisible injury is caused by two
151. Id. The court also noted that its prior decision in Shutler v. Augusta Health Care
for Women, P.L.C., 272 Va. 87, 630 S.E.2d 313 (2006), did not have to address whether the
dismissal of an employee with prejudice on procedural grounds exonerated the employer
because the order of dismissal in that case specifically indicated the case would continue
against the employer. Hughes, 273 Va. at 48-49, 49 n.2, 639 S.E.2d at 304 n.2.
152. See id., 639 S.E.2d at 304. As further support for its holding, the court noted that
a plaintiff need not file a lawsuit against an employee in order to attack the employer on a
theory of respondeat superior: "[n]o judgment against the employee individually is neces-
sary for recovery [against an employer on a theory of respondeat superior]; only a finding
that the employee was negligent." Id.
153. Sullivan v. Robertson Drug Co., 273 Va. 84, 87, 639 S.E.2d 250, 252 (2007).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 88, 639 S.E.2d at 253.
156. Id. at 89, 639 S.E.2d at 254.
157. See id. at 91, 639 S.E.2d at 254 ("Dr. Sullivan argues that the circuit court erred
in giving [jury instructions that] permitted the jury to apportion the amount of damages
based on the jury's assessment of Robertson's degree of negligence in causing Hopper's in-
jury.").
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tortfeasors, each tortfeasor is liable for the whole injury irrespec-
tive of his degree of fault. 158
The resolution of the second issue rested on similar principles.
Robertson argued that the jury should have considered the rea-
sonableness of the settlement between Hopper and Sullivan to
determine the amount of any judgment against him. 159 Robertson
thus advocated an instruction that would have allowed the jury to
consider the fact that the settlement compensated Hopper for
damage not attributable to Robertson.16 ° The court rejected this
argument and the accompanying instruction because, again, es-
tablished precedent does not allow for apportionment of damages
based on the comparative negligence of multiple tortfeasors
where there is an indivisible injury.'61 Although the court ac-
knowledged that in a contribution action the jury can consider the
reasonableness of the settlement, it can do so only in the context
of determining whether the settlement fairly compensated the
original plaintiff for his indivisible injury. 162
F. Statutes of Limitations
1. Harmon v. Sadjadi
Harmon is notable because it overruled a prior case, McDaniel
v. North Carolina Pulp Co., which held that a person who quali-
fies out-of-state as the representative of an estate can file an ac-
tion on behalf of the estate in Virginia which tolls the statute of
158. See id. at 92, 639 S.E.2d at 255 (citing Maroulis v. Elliott, 207 Va. 503, 511, 151
S.E.2d 339, 345 (1966); Von Roy v. Whitescarver, 197 Va. 384, 393, 89 S.E.2d 346, 352
(1955); Murray v. Smithson, 187 Va. 759, 764, 48 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1948); Richmond Coca-
Cola Bottling Works, Inc. v. Andrews, 173 Va. 240, 250-51, 3 S.E.2d 419, 423 (1939)).
159. Id. at 93-94, 639 S.E.2d at 256 ("Robertson contends that although the settlement
may have been reasonable with regard to Dr. Sullivan and Hopper's several claims against
Dr. Sullivan, the settlement was unreasonable with regard to Robertson because it in-
cluded claims, injuries, and damages that were not the product of the concurrent negli-
gence of Dr. Sullivan and Robertson. We find no merit in Robertson's arguments.").
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id. (noting that "a fact finder may consider the reasonableness of the settle-
ment agreement only with regard to the indivisible injury sustained and may not consider
... whether the remaining tortfeasors caused the injuries that were the basis for the set-
tlement. Robertson's argument addressing the reasonableness of the settlement is unper-
suasive because it confuses these two concepts").
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limitations. 163 McDaniel, the court held, was wrongly decided be-
cause it violated other precedent that establishes a lawsuit filed
by a person who lacks standing has no legal effect.164 Getting to
that point, however, was challenging because the Harmon case
involved a complex set of dates.
On June 6, 2001, Dr. Sadjadi performed surgery in Virginia on
James Harmon, who was a resident of West Virginia. 16' A sponge
was left inside Mr. Harmon's abdominal cavity at the conclusion
of surgery. 166 It caused him weakness, pain, and dehydration un-
til it was removed on November 8, 2001.167 Mr. Harmon died on
May 1, 2003 and on July 18, 2003, Dorothy Harmon qualified as
his personal representative in West Virginia. 6 8 On October 29,
2003, Mrs. Harmon filed suit against Dr. Sadjadi in Virginia, but
nonsuited the action approximately one year later. 169 On January
13, 2004, the administration of Mr. Harmon's estate in West Vir-
ginia closed. 7 ° On December 6, 2004, Mrs. Harmon qualified as
personal representative of Mr. Harmon's estate in Virginia, and
she filed a personal injury action on behalf of the estate in Vir-
ginia on March 24, 2005.171 The defendant filed a plea of the stat-
ute of limitations to the March 24, 2005 action.'72 The trial court
granted the plea, and Mrs. Harmon appealed.'73
On appeal, Mrs. Harmon argued that the March 24, 2005 suit
was timely because Virginia Code sections 8.01-229(B)(1) and
(B)(6) 1 4 effectively allow a personal representative up to three
163. 273 Va. 184, 192-94, 197, 639 S.E.2d 294, 299-31 (2007) (overruling McDaniel v.
North Carolina Pulp Co., 198 Va. 612, 95 S.E.2d 201 (1956)).
164. See id. at 193-94, 639 S.E.2d at 299-300.
165. See id. at 187, 639 S.E.2d at 295.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 187-88, 639 S.E.2d at 295-96.
173. Id. at 188, 639 S.E.2d at 296.
174. Virginia Code section 8.01-229(B)(1) provides, in relevant part:
If a person entitled to bring a personal action dies with no such action pend-
ing before the expiration of the limitation period for commencement thereof,
then an action may be commenced by the decedent's personal representative
before the expiration of the limitation period ... or within one year after his
qualification as personal representative, whichever occurs later.
Virginia Code section 8.01-229(B)(6) provides:
If there is an interval of more than two years between the death of any per-
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years from the date of death to file a personal injury action, 175
which, in this case, would have been May 1, 2006. The court re-
jected this argument because Virginia Code section 8.01-
229(B)(6), by its plain terms, applies only when there has been a
delay of more than two years in the qualification of a personal
representative.'76 In this case, Mrs. Harmon qualified on Decem-
ber 6, 2004, which was less than two years after Mr. Harmon's
death on May 1, 2003. Thus, Mrs. Harmon could not take advan-
tage of the tolling provisions in Virginia Code section 8.01-
229(B)(6). 177
Nevertheless, the court ultimately concluded that Mrs. Harmon
could pursue her March 24, 2005 action because Virginia Code
section 8.01-229(B)(1) allows a personal representative to file a
personal injury action on behalf of the estate within the original
limitations period or within one year after the qualification of the
personal representative, whichever occurs later. 7  In reaching
this conclusion, however, the court had to overrule McDaniel,
which held that a suit filed in Virginia by a person qualified as a
personal representative in another state tolls the statute of limi-
tations in Virginia. 171
The defendant used McDaniel to argue that if foreign qualifica-
tion in that case had some legal effect, then the foreign qualifica-
son in whose favor or against whom a cause of action has accrued or shall
subsequently accrue and the qualification of such person's personal represen-
tative, such personal representative shall, for the purposes of this chapter, be
deemed to have qualified on the last day of such two-year period.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(B)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
175. Harmon, 273 Va. at 189, 639 S.E.2d at 296.
176. Id. at 191, 639 S.E.2d at 298.
177. See id.
178. Notably, there may have been an argument not raised by the defendant that Vir-
ginia Code section 8.01-229(B)(1) did not apply. By its terms, it appears the statute applies
only when a person entitled to bring a personal injury action dies with no such action
pending before the expiration of the original limitations period. An argument could be
made (assuming the continuing treatment rule, see generally Farley v. Goode, 219 Va. 969,
252 S.E.2d 594 (1979), and the extension provision of Virginia Code section 8.01-243(c)(1)
do not apply) that the original limitations period began to run on June 1, 2001 and expired
on June 1, 2003, and that no personal injury action, which was not filed until October
2003, was pending before the expiration of the limitations period. Thus, the statute might
not apply. But this argument hinges on the application of the word "before" to "no such
action pending." If, instead, the word "before" applies to the death of the party, then Mr.
Harmon's death in May 2003, which occurred before the expiration of the limitations pe-
riod in June 2003, would trigger application of the statute.
179. See Harman, 273 Va. at 192-95, 639 S.E.2d at 298-300 (discussing its holding in
McDaniel).
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tion of Mrs. Harmon in West Virginia should also have legal ef-
fect.18° That is, the one year period found in Virginia Code section
8.01-229(B)(1) should have started to run from July 18, 2003, the
date Mrs. Harmon qualified as personal representative in West
Virginia.'81 Defendant argued that although the one year period
was tolled while the first case, filed October 29, 2003, was pend-
ing, it began to run again when the estate closed in West Virginia
on January 13, 2004.18 Adding all the relevant time periods un-
der the defendant's analysis amounted to a seventeen-month de-
lay between qualification in West Virginia and the filing of the
action in Virginia, longer than the one year allowed by Virginia
Code section 8.01-229(B)(1).' 83
The court rejected the defendant's analysis because it con-
cluded that McDaniel was a "flagrant error." "8 McDaniel violated
the well-established principle that a suit filed by a person who
lacks standing has no legal effect.' 85 McDaniel could not, there-
fore, support the defendant's argument that West Virginia quali-
fication triggered the running of the Virginia statute's one year
period. 186
2. Janvier v. Arminio
Janvier involved three cases filed by plaintiff against his podia-
trist for alleged malpractice. 187 The plaintiff timely filed the first
case in May 2001, but it was nonsuited without notice to the de-
fendant in June 2002.188 The second case was filed in October
2002, but it too was nonsuited without notice to the defendant in
December 2003.189 The third case was filed in May 2004 and
served in August 2004.190 The defendant moved to dismiss the
third case on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limi-
tations, but the plaintiff countered that it was timely because it
180. See id. at 190-91, 639 S.E.2d at 297-98.
181. See id. at 191, 639 S.E.2d at 297.
182. See id.
183. Id., 639 S.E.2d at 298.
184. Id. at 192, 639 S.E.2d at 299.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 197-98, 639 S.E.2d at 301-02.
187. See Janvier v. Arminio, 272 Va. 353, 359-60, 634 S.E.2d 754, 756-57 (2006).
188. Id. at 359, 634 S.E.2d at 756.
189. Id. at 359, 634 S.E.2d at 756-57.
190. Id. at 359, 634 S.E.2d at 757.
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was filed within six months of the last nonsuit as allowed by Vir-
ginia Code section 8.01-229(E)(3).' 9' The defendant riposted that
the second nonsuit was a legal nullity because it was entered
without notice to the defendant.192 The trial court agreed and
held that the second nonsuit was a legal nullity and void ab initio
and, therefore, the third case was untimely because the six-
month extension of Virginia Code section 8.01-229(E)(3) did not
apply. 193 The court dismissed the second case because it had been
pending longer than one year without service on the defendant in
violation of Rule 3:5(e). 194
The supreme court reversed and held that the nonsuit of the
second case was not void ab initio because Virginia Code section
8.01-380195 contains no express provision for notification of par-
ties of a second nonsuit. 196 To rule otherwise would be to amend
the statute by judicial fiat.'97 Because the second case nonsuit
was effective, the third case benefited from the six-month exten-
sion and was timely filed. 19 Thus, the plaintiff could proceed
against the defendant in the third case.'99
The court noted in its opinion that the General Assembly would
do well to amend the nonsuit statute to require notice to defen-
191. See id. at 359-60, 634 S.E.2d at 757. Virginia Code section 8.01-229(E)(3) pro-
vides, in relevant part:
If a plaintiff suffers a voluntary nonsuit as prescribed in § 8.01-380, the stat-
ute of limitations with respect to such action shall be tolled by the com-
mencement of the nonsuited action, and the plaintiff may recommence his ac-
tion within six months from the date of the order entered by the court, or
within the original period of limitation, . . . whichever period is longer.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(E)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
192. See Janvier, 272 Va. at 360, 634 S.E.2d at 757.
193. See id. at 361, 634 S.E.2d at 758.
194. See id. at 362, 634 S.E.2d at 758.
195. Virginia Code section 8.01-380(B) provides in pertinent part: "Only one nonsuit
may be taken to a cause of action or against the same party to the proceeding, as a matter
of right, although the court may allow additional nonsuits or counsel may stipulate to ad-
ditional nonsuits." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(B) (Cum. Supp. 2006). Although the defen-
dant acknowledged the statute contains no express provision requiring notice of a second
nonsuit, he argued that the court's discretion in granting a second nonsuit could be in-
formed only with the participation of the defendants. See Janvier, 272 Va. at 366, 634
S.E.2d at 761.
196. 272 Va. at 365, 634 S.E.2d at 760.
197. Id. at 366, 634 S.E.2d at 760-61 (quoting McManama v. Plunk, 250 Va. 27, 32,
458 S.E.2d 759, 762 (1995)).
198. Id. at 367, 634 S.E.2d at 761.
199. See id.
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dants of a second nonsuit. °° The General Assembly responded
and amended the statute accordingly.201
G. Pleading and Practice
1. Ford Motor Co. v. Benitez
In Benitez, the trial court sanctioned a defense attorney for in-
cluding thirteen affirmative defenses in an answer to a recom-
menced nonsuited action.2 °2 The defense attorney included these
defenses even though extensive discovery in the original action
revealed no factual bases supporting them.2 °3 In the absence of
supporting factual bases, the court held that the sanctions were
appropriate under Virginia Code section 8.01-271.1, 204 which pro-
vides that "[tihe signature of an attorney or party constitutes a
certificate by him that . . . he has read the pleading, motion, or
other paper, [and that] . . . to the best of his knowledge, informa-
tion and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well
grounded in fact."20 5
The court further rejected the defendant's argument that he
was entitled to plead the numerous defenses because discovery
might later reveal factual support for them.20 6 This tactic is "op-
pressive," the court held, because it makes parties "shoulder the
burden of preparing to meet" claims and defenses that may never
have a basis in fact; Virginia Code section 8.01-271.1 was specifi-
cally designed to prevent this "abuse" of the pleading process.0 7
200. See id. at 357, 634 S.E.2d at 755 ("Both future plaintiffs and defendants might
well benefit should the General Assembly amend Code § 8.01-380 by providing a require-
ment for notice or the exercise of due diligence to give notice to a defendant when a plain-
tiff seeks a second or subsequent nonsuit.").
201. Virginia Code section 8.01-380 was amended in 2007 and now requires that
[Wihen suffering a nonsuit, a party shall inform the court if the cause of ac-
tion has been previously nonsuited. Any order effecting a subsequent nonsuit
shall reflect all prior nonsuits and shall include language that reflects the
date of any previous nonsuit together with the court in which any previous
nonsuit was taken.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(B) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
202. Ford Motor Co. v. Benitez, 273 Va. 242, 247-48, 639 S.E.2d 203, 205-06 (2004).
203. See id., 639 S.E.2d at 204-06.
204. See id. at 252, 639 S.E.2d at 207.
205. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
206. Benitez, 273 Va. at 251-52, 639 S.E.2d at 207.
207. Id. at 252, 639 S.E.2d at 207-08.
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The proper remedy for a party who discovers facts during litiga-
tion that may support the assertion of a claim or defense is to
move the court for leave to amend its pleading."' The court reit-
erated that failure to grant leave to amend is normally an abuse
of discretion.209
2. Bio-Medical Applications of Virginia, Inc. v. Coston
In Coston, a medical malpractice case, the court clarified when
a plaintiff may take a nonsuit under Virginia Code section 8.01-
380 once a dispositive motion has been submitted to the trial
court.210 The dispositive motion before the trial court was the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment arguing that the plain-
tiffs case should be dismissed because he had no expert to testify
that the defendant's actions fell below the standard of care. 21' The
trial court heard oral argument from the defendant on the motion
and heard from the plaintiff in response.212 The trial court then
stated it would hear the "final word" from defense counsel, who
gave a brief rebuttal to plaintiffs response. 213 After the defen-
dant's rebuttal, the trial court indicated that medical malpractice
actions do indeed require expert testimony on the standard of
care. 214 It then asked if any of the parties would like "to move the
court."21 5 Taking the hint, the plaintiff moved for a voluntary
nonsuit, which was granted over the defendant's objection that it
came too late.216 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia agreed
that the nonsuit came too late.217
The court held that the nonsuit statute contemplates three con-
ceptually distinct situations concerning the timing of a voluntary
nonsuit. 18 The first situation involves those cases in which a mo-
tion to strike the plaintiffs evidence is submitted to the trial
208. Id., 639 S.E.2d at 208.
209. Id. (citing Mortarino v. Consultant Eng'g Servs., 251 Va. 289, 295-96, 467 S.E.2d
778, 782 (1996)).
210. Bio-Med. Applications v. Coston, 272 Va. 489, 634 S.E.2d 349 (2006).
211. 272 Va. at 492, 634 S.E.2d at 350.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. Indeed, the supreme court believed the trial court ruled rather than simply
"indicated." See id. at 494, 634 S.E.2d at 351.
215. Id. at 492, 634 S.E.2d at 350.
216. See id.
217. Id. at 495, 634 S.E.2d at 352.
218. Id. at 492, 634 S.E.2d at 350.
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court after the plaintiff has presented his evidence to the jury and
has rested.219 In this first situation, a plaintiff can take a nonsuit
up until the time the trial court actually sustains the motion to
strike.22 °
The second situation contemplates cases where the jury has
heard all the evidence, has been charged, and has retired from
the bar to begin deliberations.221 In this second situation, a plain-
tiff can take a nonsuit up until the time the jury has actually re-
tired from the bar to begin its deliberations.222
The third situation contemplates an action that is in the hands
of the trial judge for final disposition, either on the merits or on a
dispositive motion. 223 The defendant's summary judgment motion
in Coston placed the case in this third class because the action
was in the hands of the trial judge for final disposition once all
parties had briefed and presented oral argument on the matter.224
Thus, the plaintiffs motion for nonsuit, which was interposed af-
ter oral argument concluded, came too late.225
H. Corporate: Parikh v. Family Care Center
Although Parikh involved the enforcement of a non-compete
clause, the manner in which the ultimate decision was reached
may force health care providers to reconsider their incorporating
documents and employment agreements. This case involved an
employment agreement between Family Care Center, Inc., which
was originally organized as a professional corporation, and Dr.
Parikh. 226 Family Care Center's lone shareholder was Dr. Burns,
who died in an automobile accident in 2003.227 Thereafter, his
widow Mrs. Burns, who was not a doctor, became the sole share-
holder. 2 ' In the absence of a professional shareholder, the profes-
219. Id.
220. Id. at 493, 634 S.E.2d at 351. This is the so-called "Berryman rule." See Berryman
v. Moody, 205 Va. 516, 518-19, 137 S.E.2d 900, 902 (1964).
221. Coston, 272 Va. at 492-93, 634 S.E.2d at 350.
222. Id., 634 S.E.2d at 350-51.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 494, 634 S.E.2d at 351.
225. Id. at 495, 634 S.E.2d at 352.
226. Parikh v. Family Care Ctr., Inc., 273 Va. 284, 286, 641 S.E.2d 98, 99 (2007).
227. Id.
228. Id.
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sional corporation converted to a simple corporation by operation
of Virginia Code section 13.1-552(B). 229
The employment agreement between Family Care Center and
Dr. Parikh contained two provisions of import to the court's
analysis. First, the agreement provided that Family Care Center
was "engaged in the practice of medicine."23 ° Second, the agree-
ment contained a non-compete clause requiring that Dr. Parikh,
for up to three years after termination of his employment, pay
Family Care Center $10,000 a month for each month he practiced
medicine within twenty miles of the Center.231 Dr. Parikh vio-
lated the agreement and lost in the trial court on an action to en-
force the non-compete clause.
2 32
On appeal, the supreme court held that the non-compete clause
should not be enforced because it did not further the "legitimate
business interests" of Family Care Center. 233 Family Care Center,
a non-professional corporation, had no right to practice medicine
in Virginia pursuant to Virginia Code section 54.1-111(A), which
provides that no person or corporation can practice a professional
occupation without a license to do so. 234 Because Family Care
Center had no license to practice medicine,235 the corporate pur-
pose-as set forth in the employment agreement-to "engage in
the practice of medicine" was not "legitimate."236 Thus, the non-
compete clause could not be enforced.237
229. Id. Virginia Code section 13.1-552(B) provides, in relevant part:
Whenever all shareholders of a corporation licensed under this chapter cease
at any one time and for any reason to be licensed, certified or registered in
the particular field of endeavor for which the corporation was organized,...
the corporation thereupon shall be treated as converted into, and shall oper-
ate henceforth solely as, a corporation.
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-552(B) (Repl. Vol. 2006).
230. Parikh, 273 Va. at 287, 641 S.E.2d at 99.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 291, 641 S.E.2d at 101.
234. Virginia Code section 54.1-111(A) provides in part that "[iut shall be unlawful for
any person, partnership, corporation or other entity to engage in ... [p]racticing a profes-
sion or occupation without holding a valid license as required by statute or regulation."
VA. CODE ANN. § 54. 1-111(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2005 & Cum. Supp. 2006).
235. Indeed, the court noted that the Board of Medicine apparently has no statutory
authority to issue licenses to corporate entities. Parikh, 273 Va. at 290 n.3, 641 S.E.2d at
101 n.3.
236. See id. at 290-91, 641 S.E.2d at 101.
237. See id.
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Although the court took pains to repeatedly reference the fact
that Family Care Center was a "non-professional corporation" by
concluding that it could not practice medicine, it seems a faithful
application of Virginia Code section 54.1-111(A) would dictate the
same conclusion even if it were a professional corporation.238
Health care providers would do well, therefore, to closely examine
their incorporating documents and employment agreements to
ensure they do not evince an illegitimate purpose to engage in the
practice of medicine.239
II. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DEVELOPMENTS
The 2007 General Assembly Session was active, with 3,067
pieces of legislation introduced.24 ° Although the long-running con-
troversy surrounding the General Assembly's efforts to fund the
state's transportation needs continued, the legislative session ad-
journed on time with both a budget and a transportation bill.
Some significant legislation in the health care area was also ad-
dressed. Health care remains a focus of the executive branch as
well, with Governor Kaine creating a Healthcare Reform Com-
mission in 2006, scheduled to provide a report and recommenda-
tions in September 2007.241 Articulating the current policy em-
phasis on health care, the Governor stated:
Ensuring access to quality healthcare that is safe and affordable is
one of the most fundamental commitments we have to our citizens,
S.. with more than one million Virginians lacking healthcare cover-
age, and growing shortages of health professionals in all disciplines
across the Commonwealth and the nation, we must look for creative
ways to further improve the delivery of healthcare to Virginians.
242
238. Virginia Code section 54.1-111(A) does not distinguish between professional and
non-professional organizations. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-111(A) (Repl. Vol. 2005 & Cum.
Supp. 2007).
239. The court noted that Virginia Code section 13.1-542.1 allows non-professional cor-
porations to "render" professional services. But the court specifically declined to address
the extent to which this statute allows corporations to render medical services because
neither party addressed the issue. See Parikh, 273 Va. at 289, 641 S.E.2d at 100.
240. The statistics regarding the disposition of those bills are: 1553 passed, 1869 failed,
and 358 continued. Virginia General Assembly Legislative Information System, http:ll
legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?07 1+oth+STA.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2007).
241. See Press Release, Office of the Governor of Virginia, Governor Kaine Creates
Healthcare Reform Commission (Aug. 8, 2006), available at http://www.governor.virginia.
gov/mediarelations/newsreleasesviewrelease.cfm?id=206.
242. Id.
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Summaries of those 2007 legislative enactments likely to be of
particular interest to those in health care law are included below.
A. Nursing Facility Quality Improvement
The Department of Medical Assistance Services ("DMAS") has
been directed to develop a Nursing Facility Quality Improvement
program that utilizes Civil Money Penalty Funds to improve the
health, safety, and welfare of residents in nursing homes.243 This
program will replace the role of nonprofit organizations in using
Civil Monetary Penalty Funds collected by the DMAS.
B. Power of Licensure Restriction
Health regulatory boards have been given the power to sum-
marily restrict licenses, certificates, registrations, or licensure
privileges if the relevant board finds that there is a substantial
danger to the public health or safety that warrants this action.2
The board must schedule an informal conference within a reason-
able time of the date of the summary action.245 Previous statutes
allowed a board only to suspend the authority to practice under
such circumstances, but not to restrict it. 246
C. Patient Access to Their Laboratory Results
Laboratory testing results are sent to the ordering physician,
but typically not to the patient himself. As patients become more
involved and knowledgeable about their own health care, many
would like to see their own lab results. New legislation makes
this feasible. Licensed practitioners who order laboratory tests or
other examinations of the physical condition of any person may, if
requested by the patient or their legal guardian, direct the labo-
ratory or other facility conducting the test or examination to pro-
243. See Act of Mar. 19, 2007, ch. 474, 2007 Va. Acts 643 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-353.1.3 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
244. Act of Feb. 19, 2007, ch. 22, 2007 Va. Acts 21 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-2408.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
245. Id.
246. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2408.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2005).
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vide a copy of the result directly to the patient or their legal
guardian.247
D. Long Term Care and Health Care Policy
There have been a variety of pronouncements on health care
policy in the Commonwealth, particularly in the long-term care
area. The Secretary of Health and Human Resources has been
designated to "serve as the lead Secretary for the coordination
and implementation of the long-term care policy of the Common-
wealth, working with the Secretaries of Transportation, Com-
merce and Trade, and Education, and the Commissioner of In-
surance, to facilitate interagency service development and
implementation, communication and cooperation."2" The type of
long-term care services that must be provided by the Common-
wealth through the Department of Aging have been expanded to
include transportation, educational and housing services, and op-
portunities for self-care and independent living. 249
In the licensing of health care facilities, the Commissioner of
Health is required to ensure that quality of care, patient safety,
and patient privacy are the overriding goals of such licensure and
related enforcements. 5 °
The Commissioner is likewise required to coordinate with the
Department of Health's emergency preparedness and response ef-
forts and to ensure that prevention of disease and protection of
public health remain the Department's overriding goals.251
Under current law, hospice facilities must be licensed as hospi-
tals, nursing facilities, or assisted living facilities.252 Some have
raised concern about the relevance of assisted living facility regu-
247. Act of Apr. 4, 2007, ch. 887, 2007 Va. Acts 2401 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-2409.4 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
248. Act of Mar. 15, 2007, ch. 399, 2007 Va. Acts 567 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 2.2-212 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
249. Act of Mar. 23, 2007, ch. 747, 2007 Va. Acts 1137 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 2.2-701 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
250. Act of Mar. 23, 2007, ch. 797, 2007 Va. Acts 1218 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-19(B) (Cum. Supp. 2007)); Act of Mar. 13, 2007, ch. 320, 2007 Va. Acts
453 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-19(B) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
251. Act of Mar. 13, 2007, ch. 320, 2007 Va. Acts 453 (codified as Amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 32.1-19(C), (D) (Cum. Supp. 2007)); Act of Mar. 23, 2007, ch. 797, 2007 Va. Acts
1218 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-19(C), (D) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
252. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.5 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
[Vol. 42:441
HEALTH CARE
lations to hospices. To address this concern, new regulations will
be developed that are specific to hospice facilities that are not in-
patient facilities and are currently licensed as assisted living fa-
cilities.253
Another new law for assisted living facilities permits residents
to stay in such a facility when the resident's condition deterio-
rates if the resident's physician, family, and assisted living facil-
ity agree to an appropriate treatment plan.2 54 The assisted living
facility must also agree to provide the services needed by the resi-
dent.255
E. Multi-Line Telephone Systems and E911
Multi-line telephone systems acquired or installed after July 1,
2009 must be maintained and operated so that calls to 911 from
each telephone station on the system provide either automatic lo-
cation and number identification information or an alternative
method of providing call location information.256 In any medical
care facility or licensed assisted living facility, however, "tele-
phone station" includes any telephone on a multi-line telephone
system located in an administrative office, nursing station, lobby,
waiting area, or other area accessible to the general public, but
does not include a telephone located in the room of a patient or
resident. 257 The Wireless E-911 Services Board is directed to
monitor development in E-911 service and multi-line telephone
system technologies.258
F. Physician Extenders
Licensed physician assistants are authorized to prescribe
Schedule II through VI controlled substances and devices on or
after July 1, 2007.259 Properly trained personnel acting pursuant
253. Act of Mar. 15, 2007, ch. 397, 2007 Va. Acts 565 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 32.1-162.1, -162.3, -162.5, 63.2-1806 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
254. Act of Mar. 19, 2007, ch. 539, 2007 Va. Acts 736 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.2-1805(C) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
255. Id.
256. Act of Mar. 19, 2007, ch. 427, 2007 Va. Acts 595 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 56-484.23 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
257. Id. at 410 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 56-484.19 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
258. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 56-484.14 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
259. Act of Feb. 19, 2007, ch. 16, 2007 Va. Acts 15 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
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to a specific order for a patient, and under a doctor's direct and
immediate supervision, can administer certain controlled sub-
stances, provided the method of administration is not intrave-
nous, intrathecal, or epidural. 20 The prescriber of the controlled
substance remains responsible for the administration.261
G. Senior Alert Program
Similar to the Amber Alert Program for missing children, the
legislature has created a program for local, regional, and state-
wide notification of a missing senior adult.2 2 "Missing senior
adult" is defined as an individual over sixty years of age who suf-
fers from a cognitive impairment, which renders him unable to
provide care for himself without assistance (including a diagnosis
of Alzheimer's Disease or dementia), whose whereabouts are un-
known, and whose disappearance poses a credible threat to the
adult's health and safety.263 The bill also requires that no police
or sheriffs department shall establish or maintain any policy
which requires a waiting period before a missing senior adult re-
port will be accepted. 2" Within two hours of receiving a report,
the departments are required to enter identifying and descriptive
information about the missing senior adult into the Virginia
Criminal Information Network and the National Crime Informa-
tion Center systems.2 6- The departments are also required to for-
ward the information to the Virginia Department of State Police,
notify other law enforcement agencies in the area, and initiate an
investigation of the report. 266
ANN. § 54.1-2952.1 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
260. Act of Feb. 19, 2007, ch. 17, 2007 Va. Acts 15 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-3408(T) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
261. Id.
262. See Act of Mar. 19, 2007, ch. 486, 2007 Va. Acts 660 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 15.2-1718.1, 52-34.4 to -34.6 (Cum. Supp. 2006)); see also Act of Mar. 21,
2007, ch. 723, 2007 Va. Acts 1104 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.2-1718.1,
52-34.5 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
263. Act of Mar. 19, 2007, ch. 486, 2007 Va. Acts 660 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 52-34.4 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
264. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1718.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
265. Id.
266. Id.
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H. Statewide Emergency Medical Care System
The legislature has made several revisions to the procedures
related to orders of quarantine and isolation.26 7 Additional per-
sons not ordinarily authorized by law to administer or dispense
medication can now dispense and administer all necessary drugs
when the governor has declared a disaster or a state of emer-
gency. 268 Electronic legal filings are authorized to protect the pub-
lic from communicable diseases. 269 A joint subcommittee has been
formed "to study the feasibility of offering liability protections to
health care providers rendering aid during a state or local emer-
gency."2 7° The joint subcommittee will "examine the estimated
benefits to the citizens of the Commonwealth of enhanced liability
protections for health care providers" during emergencies, as well
as determine how many other states have similar protections in
place.27'
The legislature has also added provisions for additional per-
formance improvement measures and a requirement that the
statewide Trauma Triage Plan be updated triennially.2 72 In addi-
tion, the legislature granted localities the "authority to require
the review of, and suggest amendments to, the emergency plans
of nursing homes, assisted living facilities, adult day care centers,
and child day care centers" within their locales.273
I. Minimum Dollar Threshold for Reporting of Medical
Malpractice Judgments and Settlements
A bill initiated by the Medical Society of Virginia has resulted
in legislation to better define the requirements of physician re-
porting of medical malpractice judgments and settlements to the
267. See Act of Mar. 21, 2007, ch. 699, 2007 Va. Acts 1060 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of VA. CODE ANN.); see also Act of Mar. 23, 2007, ch. 783, 2007 Va. Acts 1195
(codified as amended in scattered sections of VA. CODE ANN.).
268. Act of Mar. 21, 2007, ch. 699, 2007 Va. Acts 1060 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-42.1 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
269. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-48.013:1 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
270. See H.J. Res. 701, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2007); S.J. Res. 390, Va. Gen.
Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2007).
271. Id.
272. See Act of Feb. 19, 2007, ch. 15, 2007 Va. Acts 13 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-111.3 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
273. Act of Mar. 8, 2007, ch. 129, 2007 Va. Acts 178 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 44-146.19(H) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
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Board of Medicine.27 4 Settlements or judgments of less than
$10,000 no longer have to be reported by the licensee, provided
the licensee has not paid another settlement or judgment within
the previous twelve months. 275 This legislation also requires that
the Board of Medicine shall not post any notice of disciplinary ac-
tion on its website or online physician practice profile unless
there has been an order finding a disciplinary violation and the
Board establishes a process for removal of such notices already
published that did not result in a disciplinary violation finding. 276
J. Expert Certification Statutes
The statutes requiring that a plaintiff have a signed supportive
statement from a qualified expert witness prior to requesting ser-
vice of process in a medical malpractice suit277 have been
amended by the legislature to likewise impose the requirement
where the defendant has agreed to accept service of process.278
These statutes, as originally enacted, prevent defense counsel
from obtaining information about the identity of the certifying ex-
pert, who need not be disclosed and who need not testify at
trial. 279 The new legislation also restricts the defendant in such
cases from obtaining information about the qualifications of the
certifying expert. 280
K. Tanning Bed Regulations
Tanning facilities must now require customers to sign a writ-
ten statement warning of the potential dangers of tanning bed
use.28' Customers under fifteen, and not emancipated under Vir-
ginia law, must have a parent signature on such a form every six
months.28 2 Facility owners are also required by this legislation to
274. See Act of Apr. 4, 2007, ch. 861, 2007 Va. Acts 2332 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2900, -2910.1, -2910.2, -2912.3 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
275. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2910.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
276. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2910.2 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
277. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-20.1, -50.1, 16.1-83.1 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
278. See Act of Mar. 19, 2007, ch. 489, 2007 Va. Acts 663 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-20.1, -50.1, 16.1-83.1 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
279. See id.
280. Id.
281. Act of Mar. 19, 2007, ch. 575, 2007 Va. Acts 789 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 59.1-310.3(B) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
282. Id.
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identify each customer's skin type using the Fitzpatrick scale28 3
and to advise customers of their maximum time of recommended
exposure. 24 Tanning facilities are prohibited from claiming that
the use of tanning devices is safe, free from risk, or will provide
health benefits.285
L. Privileged Communications for Health Care Providers
Legislation originally introduced in response to the Supreme
Court of Virginia's ruling in Johnson v. Riverside. 6 was unable to
find consensus among the stakeholders. The portion of the origi-
nal legislation intended to restore the privilege applicable to inci-
dent reports and other hospital-based quality assurance pro-
grams was ultimately struck from the final bill.287 As amended,
the bill clarifies the scope of the physician-based quality assur-
ance programs to specify that the twenty-four hour exception to
the protection from discovery of statements made as part of an
investigation is applicable only to the physician office-based peer
review programs, not to hospital-based peer review and quality
assurance processes.288
M. Direct Patient Access to Physical Therapy Services
Patients can now access physical therapists without a referral
from a physician under the following circumstances: (i) the pa-
tient is not under the care of a physician for the condition at is-
sue; (ii) the patient identifies the physician from whom he or she
will obtain care if the condition persists; and (iii) the physical
therapist must notify the physician within three days of treat-
ment and provide the physician with a copy of the patient evalua-
tion and patient history. 29 The final legislation eliminates the
previous diagnosis requirement and permits a physical therapist
283. Id.
284. Act of Mar. 19, 2007, ch. 575, 2007 Va. Acts 789 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 59.1-310.5(B) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
285. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-310.5(H) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
286. See supra Part I.A.
287. See Act of Mar. 19, 2007, ch. 530, 2007 Va. Acts 726 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
288. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17(B) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
289. Act of Feb. 19, 2007, ch. 18, 2007 Va. Acts 18 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-3482(B) (Cum. Supp. 2007)); Act of Feb. 19, 2007, ch. 9, 2007 Va. Acts 4 (codi-
fied as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3482(B) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
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to evaluate a patient and treat them for fourteen business days
before a physician referral is needed. 29" This legislation requires
that a direct access certification process be implemented for those
physical therapists seeking to practice without referral under the
new legislation.29' The certification ensures that individuals prac-
ticing under the new law have appropriate education in medical
screening and differential diagnosis. 292 Regulations to implement
the certification process will be promulgated by the Board of
Physical Therapy, and the new law will not go into effect until
that process is completed.293
N. Combating Childhood Obesity
The legislature directed the Departments of Education and
Health to work together to combat childhood obesity and other
chronic health conditions that affect school-age children.294
0. "Abraham's Law"
This bill derived from the 2006 Eastern Shore case in which
the department of social services alleged that the parents of a
teenage boy named Starchild Abraham Cerrix committed medical
neglect by respecting their son's decision to forego chemother-
apy. 29 The bill allows children fourteen or older, jointly with
their parents, to make a decision to refuse medical treatment-
provided the child has sufficient maturity, all reasonable treat-
ment options have been considered, and the parents believe refus-
ing a particular treatment is in the child's best interests.29 6
290. Act of Feb. 19, 2007, ch. 18, 2007 Va. Acts 18 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-3482(B) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
291. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3482.1 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Act of Feb. 19, 2007, ch. 43, 2007 Va. Acts 42 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 22.1-23, 32.1-19 (Cum. Supp. 2007)); Act of Feb. 19, 2007, ch. 55, 2007 Va. Acts 53
(codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-23, 32.1-19 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
295. See generally Abraham's Journey, http://www.abrahamsjourney.com/ (last visited
Oct. 22, 2007).
296. Act of Mar. 19, 2007, ch. 479, 2007 Va. Acts 649 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.2-100(2) (Cum. Supp. 2007)); Act of Mar. 20, 2007, ch. 597, 2007 Va. Acts 810
(codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-100(2) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
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P. Smoking in Proximity to Hospital Oxygen Source
The obviously dangerous practice of smoking in close proximity
to an oxygen source in a health care facility, while likely a viola-
tion of the civil negligence duty, was not previously clearly identi-
fied as a criminal offense. This new legislation provides that
"[any person who smokes or uses an open flame within twenty-
five feet of a[n] . . . oxygen source in a health care facility,...
when the area is posted as an area where smoking and open
flame are prohibited is guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor. "297
Q. Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act ("UAGA")
This new law regarding anatomical gifts was adopted, in sub-
stantial part, by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in July 2006.29" The Act clarifies current law
in Virginia, addresses lack of uniformity among states, and brings
state law into conformity with federal laws applicable to organ,
tissue, and eye donation. 299 The revised Act addresses each step
in the organ and tissue donation process and establishes rules of
decision to resolve uncertainties and ambiguities that have arisen
under prior versions of the UAGA.3 °° It ensures that, if an indi-
vidual wishes to make an anatomical gift or to refuse to make
such a gift, those wishes will be respected without exception."'
The Act preserves the right of other persons to make an anatomi-
cal gift if the decedent did not make a gift during life and clari-
fies, how, to whom, and for what purpose the gift can be made.3
0 2
The Act also facilitates donations by expanding the list of persons
who can make an anatomical gift and by establishing the priority
and circumstances under which such persons may make a gift,
297. Act of Mar. 19, 2007, ch. 430, 2007 Va. Acts 599 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-511.1 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
298. Act of Feb. 23, 2007, ch. 92, 2007 Va. Acts 114 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 32.1-291.1 to -291.25, -292.2, 46.2-342, 54.1-2982, -2984, 57-48 (Cum. Supp.
2007)); Act of Apr. 4, 2007, ch. 907, 2007 Va. Acts 2491 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 32.1-291.1 to -291.25, -292.2, 46.2-342, 54.1-2982, -2984, 57-48 (Cum. Supp.
2007)).
299. Id.
300. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-291.4 to -291.25 (Cum. Supp.
2007)).
301. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-291.6 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
302. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-291.9 to -291.10 (Cum. Supp.
2007)).
2007]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
including when they will be considered available to exercise their
right to consent to, or refuse, an anatomical gift.
There are also numerous default rules for the interpretation of
a document of gift that lacks specificity. The Act affirms that pro-
curement organizations will have access to documents of gift in
donor registries, medical records, and DMV records.3"3 It also pro-
vides that taking measures to preserve the viability of organs,
tissues, and eyes for their donative purpose is not inconsistent
with a health-care directive requesting the withholding or with-
drawal of life support systems. °4 Other provisions address the re-
lationship between the medical examiner and procurement or-
ganizations to ensure, to the maximum extent possible, that
anatomical gifts are made from decedents under the jurisdiction
of the medical examiner. 3" Finally, the revised Act creates a new
crime of falsification of a gift document and continues to prohibit
the sale of bodies or body parts and increases the criminal pen-
alty from a Class 6 to a Class 4 felony.30 6
R. Prohibition of Unauthorized Pelvic Exams
Although one might wonder why such a law is necessary as it
would seem that such conduct is otherwise prohibited by law, an-
other new Virginia law specifically prohibits students participat-
ing in a course of professional instruction or clinical training pro-
gram from performing a pelvic examination on an anesthetized or
unconscious female patient.3 7 Exceptions apply if a "patient or
her authorized agent gives informed consent to such examination,
the performance of such examination is within the scope of care
ordered for the patient, or in the case of a patient incapable of
giving informed consent, the examination is necessary for diagno-
sis or treatment of such patient."30 8
303. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-291.14 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
304. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-291.14(J) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
305. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-291.22 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
306. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-291.17 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
307. Act of Mar. 20, 2007, ch. 678, 2007 Va. Acts 1032 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 54.1-2959(B) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
308. Id.
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S. Involuntary Mental Health Commitment and Custody Orders
A revision to Virginia Code sections 32.7-808 and -810 allows
an emergency or temporary custody order to include transporta-
tion to a medical facility for a medical evaluation if required by a
physician at the hospital to which the person is being trans-
ported.3 °9
T. Pregnant Women Support Act
This new law requires that, as a routine component of prenatal
care, every licensed practitioner who renders prenatal care shall
provide information and support services to patients whose fe-
tuses test positive for Down Syndrome or other prenatal condi-
tions.31° This bill also creates the Virginia Pregnant Women Sup-
port Fund "as a special nonreverting fund to be administered by
the Board of Health to support women and families who are fac-
ing [an] unplanned pregnancy." 311
U. Medical Records
Current Virginia law is more restrictive than the Health In-
surance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") in some re-
spects. HIPAA defers to state law where it is more restrictive;
therefore, hospitals have had to deny law enforcement requests
for certain patient information that HIPAA would allow to be dis-
closed but which Virginia law does not. A change in this law ex-
pands Virginia's health information disclosure authorization to
allow disclosure of additional protected health information to law
enforcement officials.312
Development of quality and compatible electronic health re-
cords in Virginia is also encouraged with new requirements that
state operated or state-funded systems of electronic health re-
309. Act of Feb. 19, 2007, ch. 7, 2007 Va. Acts 3 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 37.2-808(C), -810 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
310. Act of Mar. 23, 2007, ch. 780, 2007 Va. Acts 1192 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 54.1-2403.01(B) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
311. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-11.6 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
312. Act of Mar. 19, 2007, ch. 497, 2007 Va. Acts 673 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 32.1-127.1:03(D)(28)-(30) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
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cords be interoperable or certified by a nationally recognized cer-
tification body.313
V. Stem Cell Research
The General Assembly has elected to continue the current
study of issues related to stem cell research for another year, to
monitor the progress of the Virginia Cord Blood Bank Initiative,
established in 2006, and to review new and emerging issues in
stem cell research.314 New legislation was also enacted requiring
that human research review committees of any state institution
or agency must ensure that an overview of approved human re-
search projects and their results are made public on the institu-
tion or agency's website unless the information is otherwise ex-
empt from disclosure." 5
W. Confidentiality of Medical Examiner Reports and Findings
The legislature provided some protection to the Medical Exam-
iner from participation in discovery by requiring that all Medical
Examiner's reports and findings shall be confidential and not
available for discovery except as provided.3 16 It also created addi-
tional exceptions for reports concerning the death of a prisoner
committed to the custody of any local correctional facility.317 In
the case of the death of a committed prisoner:
Upon request, the Chief Medical Examiner shall release such au-
topsy report to the decedent's attending physician and to the per-
sonal representative or executor of the decedent or, if no personal
representative or executor is appointed, then at the discretion of the
Chief Medical Examiner, to the following persons in the following
order of priority: (i) the spouse of the decedent, (ii) an adult son or
daughter of the decedent, (iii) either parent of the decedent, (iv) an
adult sibling of the decedent, (v) any other adult relative of the dece-
dent in order of blood relationship, or (vi) any appropriate health fa-
cility quality assurance program.
313. Act of Mar. 20, 2007, ch. 635, 2007 Va. Acts 963.
314. See H.J. Res. 584, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2007).
315. Act of Mar. 15, 2007, ch. 413, 2007 Va. Acts 585 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 32.1-162.19(E) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
316. See Act of Apr. 4, 2007, ch. 868, 2007 Va. Acts 2343 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-283(B)-(C) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
317. Id.
318. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-283(C) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
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The bill also eliminates allowance for any form of disclosure other
than aggregate or statistical form of disclosure.19
X. Nursing Homes and Sex Offenders
Nursing homes and assisted living facilities must inform the
applicants and residents in writing how to obtain information
about whether there are registered sex offenders in the facility.32 °
Y. Certificate of Public Need
Several bills were introduced in the 2007 legislative session
that could have significantly impacted or even repealed the Cer-
tificate of Public Need ("COPN") law, which requires a determina-
tion of public need by the Department of Health before undertak-
ing certain health care "projects." 321 The only bill to reach the
governor's desk, however, was HB 2546. This bill increases flexi-
bility in the COPN review process by raising the capital expendi-
ture amount for projects not otherwise reviewable from $5 million
to $15 million. 22 Projects between $5 million and $15 million that
are not subject to some other statutory review provision must be
registered with the Commissioner but are no longer subject to
COPN review. 23 For projects that have already received approval
from the Department of Health, this bill permits the Commis-
sioner to approve a significant change in cost that exceeds the au-
thorized capital expenditure by more than twenty percent if the
applicant can demonstrate that the cost increases do not result in
any material expansion of the project.3 24
In addition to legislation intended to reform the current COPN
process, significant regulatory activity has occurred with respect
319. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-283.4(D) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
320. Act of Mar. 8, 2007, ch. 120, 2007 Va. Acts 170 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 32.1-138(A)(16) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
321. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.1 (Repl. Vol. 2004) (defining "project"); see also VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.3 (Repl. Vol. 2004) (same). The following legislation failed or was
withdrawn: HB 2274 sought repeal of Virginia's Certificate of Public Need laws; HB 2155
introduced significant reforms to the COPN process; HB 2276 sought reformation of the
COPN application process and regional health planning operations; HB 2277 sought to
eliminate the role of the regional health planning agencies in the COPN review process.
322. Act of Mar. 9, 2007, ch. 502, 2007 Va. Acts 684 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 32.1-102.1 (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
323. Id.
324. Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 2007)).
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to the State Medical Facilities Plan ("SMFP").325 The SMFP is a
planning document adopted by the Board of Health that contains
criteria and standards for the review of COPN projects.326 The
current SMFP was written in the early 1990s and is consequently
outdated. In 2006, the Department of Health prepared a redraft
of the SMFP, which went to a public hearing and a variety of re-
view sessions. As a result of those sessions, the SMFP was fur-
ther rewritten and will undergo a second public hearing with a
goal of presenting the document to the State Board of Health for
adoption at its fall 2007 meeting.
Compliance with the SMFP is only one of twenty statutorily
required considerations the Commissioner must take into account
when reviewing a COPN application.327 A recent trend in the
Commissioner's determinations has been the abandonment of the
Department of Health's prior practice of accepting an applicant's
demonstration that it has achieved the numerical standard set
forth in the SMFP for a particular project as the principal, if not
sole, basis for approval. In the past year, compliance with the
SMFP has become merely a necessary but not sufficient condi-
tion; the decision now hinges upon the other nineteen statutorily
required considerations.328
III. CONCLUSION
Longtime CBS-NEWS anchor personality Walter Cronkite once
said: "America's health care system is neither healthy, caring, nor
a system."329 The dedicated professionals who work in this field
might dispute this statement though most would agree the sys-
tem falls short of its goals. We can expect the effectiveness of the
system to continue to be debated in the public discourse, 330 and
we can expect the law in Virginia to both lead and follow such dis-
cussions. President Bush has stated: "America needs a health
care system that empowers patients to make rational and smart
decisions for themselves and their families, a health care system
325. 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 5-230-10 to 5-360-70.
326. 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-230-20.
327. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.3(B) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
328. See Comm's Decisions regarding COPN Request No. VA-7262 (Apr. 3, 2006) and
COPN Request No. VA-7059 (Apr. 20, 2006) (on file with author).
329. Borderline Medicine (PBS television broadcast Dec. 17, 1990).
330. See, e.g., SICKO (Michael Moore 2007).
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in which the relationship between the patient and the provider
are central, not a health care system where decisions are made by
the federal government."33' We can anticipate that the coming
year will continue to bring debate and perhaps significant change
in health law on a national level as well.
As the political landscape changes, we may see renewed efforts
at national health care reform, as well as continued change in
Virginia. Several significant controversial topics, including tort
reform or revision to the medical malpractice damages cap,3 2 the
Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Pro-
gram, and charitable immunity, saw little change in 2007. The
Supreme Court of Virginia's Commission on Mental Health Law
Reform continues its work.333 As of this writing, the Supreme
Court of Virginia has also accepted two cases from the Char-
lottesville Circuit Court on the question of whether foundations
set up to support teaching hospitals are entitled to charitable
immunity.334 The stakeholders are also preparing for debate and
decision on the medical malpractice damages cap and the Birth
Injury Fund at the General Assembly, so these issues look to be
on the top of the dynamic Virginia health law agenda for the 2008
legislative session.
331. President George W. Bush, Remarks on Healthcare Initiatives (Apr. 4, 2006)
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/04/20060404.html.
332. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
333. See Commission on Mental Healthcare Reform, http://www.dmhmrsas.virginia.gov
/OMH-MentalHealthCommission.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2007).
334. See Morris v. Univ. of Va. Health Serv. Found., No. 05-163, 2006 Va. Cir. LEXIS
293 (Cir. Ct. Oct. 25, 2006) (Charlottesville City), appeal docketed, No. 070214 (Va. June 5,
2007); MacArthur v. Univ. of Va. Health Serv. Found., No. CL04-154, 2006 Va. Cir. LEXIS
294 (Cir. Ct. Dec. 8, 2006) (Charlottesville City), appeal docketed, No. 070475 (Va. June 6,
2007); see also Wright v. Silver, No. L05-2396, 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 14 (Cir. Ct. Feb 14,
2007) (Norfolk City).
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